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This descriptive study examines how  nine firms integrate tax planning into 
other business planning.  I  More specifically, it considers how taxes influence 
companies’ decisions on capacity expansion (the location decision) and on the 
use of  existing capacity (the sourcing decision). The study will identify im- 
portant tax and nontax factors that firms consider when making location and 
sourcing decisions and will assess the relative importance of different factors 
on these decisions. The findings are based on interviews with chief financial 
officers and high-level manufacturing, treasury, tax, and strategy managers. 
These conversations centered on sixty-eight location decisions that were made 
during the past twenty-five years. 
The subsequent analysis argues that the relative importance of taxes in ex- 
plaining location and sourcing decisions varies considerably across industries 
and business activities (e.g., R&D, manufacturing, marketing). A conceptual 
framework, based largely on theory discussed in Porter (1990) and Scholes 
and Wolfson (1991), is proposed to identify salient industry and business ac- 
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1. As will be discussed in section 6.2, the sample firms were selected because they were known 
to have operations in low-tax countries. All of the firms are in an excess foreign tax credit limita- 
tion, though most of them claim to be close to an excess credit position. Thus, the usual caveat 
about drawing inferences  from small biased samples is amplified here. To facilitate the exposition, 
however, I have not qualified the text to account for this bias. Wherever possible, I integrate my 
findings into the conceptual framework developed in section 6.1. This should help readers assess 
whether these findings extend to other firms. 
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tivity characteristics that determine the role of  taxes in location decisions.2 
The framework builds on the Scholes and Wolfson theme that efficient tax 
planning differs from tax minimization. In the Scholes and Wolfson frame- 
work, tax planning is subordinate (as a managerial objective) to maximizing 
firm value. Therefore, tax planners must sometimes sacrifice tax benefits be- 
cause of  nontax considerations. Scholes and Wolfson refer to these nontax 
considerations as restrictions and frictions that impede tax minimization. Re- 
strictions are government rules.  Frictions are all other impediments to tax 
minimization,  including costs associated with  meeting other business  pur- 
poses.  Frictions  and  restrictions  are  related.3 By  identifying frictions,  or 
equivalently nontax considerations, associated with location and sourcing de- 
cisions and by understanding how they evolve over time, we can better under- 
stand the role that taxes play in these  decision^.^ 
The framework proposes three categories of frictions that are based on Por- 
ter’s global strategy theory: coupling frictions, which tend to fuse activities 
together in a firm’s value chain; country frictions, which are the opportunity 
cost of  locating a specific activity, or collection of  activities, in a particular 
country; and coordination frictions, which are associated with incentive and 
communication mechanisms that impede tax minimization. Firms assign ac- 
tivities in their product value chains to countries where the maximum value is 
added at a minimum after-tax cost. To this end, they must first identify spots 
in their value chains where coupling frictions are small, and then locate these 
separate activities, taking account of  country and coordination frictions and 
local taxes. 
The interviews with the sample firms’ managers suggest a number of con- 
clusions: 
Tax considerations largely dictate location decisions for business activities 
where these frictions are small, such as administrative and distribution cen- 
ters 
Nontax considerations are very important in all manufacturing location de- 
2. In developing their frameworks, both Porter (1990) and Scholes and Wolfson  (1991) ac- 
knowledge other authors’ contributions. Rather than conduct an extensive literature review, I cite 
these two works repeatedly because they summarize and/or develop the requisite strategy and tax 
background for this paper. 
3. Scholes and Wolfson develop the relationship between frictions and restrictions. In particu- 
lar, frictions curb both favorable and unfavorable economic activity. When they curb unfavorable 
activity, they preclude the necessity for government restrictions (e.g., tax rules). When they curb 
desired activity, policymakers must offer tax benefits to compensate for the cost associated with 
the frictions. 
4. Admittedly, referring to marketing,  manufacturing,  and  other business considerations as 
frictions is a rather egocentric view of taxes.  An alternative expositional approach would have 
been to describe taxes as but one of several costs that managers must consider to maximize firm 
value when making location and sourcing decisions. The Scholes and Wolfson framework is used 
here because my primary objective is to study how nontax factors affect tax planning. 197  The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
cisions, including those where the final decision is to locate in a low-tax 
country 
Flexibility in setting transfer prices is related to gross margins and the abil- 
ity to decouple activities in the value chain 
Threats of significant penalties and extensive audits in many countries have 
recently curbed managers’ ability to transfer price aggressively5 
Tax  transfer prices do not affect performance evaluations for the sample 
firms, either because they use separate transfer prices for managerial and 
tax  purposes or because they use pretax evaluation measures that do not 
depend on transfer prices 
Larger decentralized firms use location team contests to coordinate more 
efficient local and corporate tax planning 
The role that taxes play in location and sourcing decisions and, more gen- 
erally, the relative importance of various nontax considerations in these de- 
cisions have changed dramatically during the past twenty years 
Tax compliance costs have also increased considerably 
Furthermore, public goods that are subsidized by taxes, such as education and 
transportation, weigh heavily in many location decisions.6 Thus, because tax 
rates can reflect infrastructure differences, resource allocations are not neces- 
sarily inefficient when location decisions are tax motivated. 
Section 6.1 presents an informal conceptual framework for analyzing the 
role of  taxes in  location and sourcing decisions. Section 6.2 describes the 
sample firms and the interview procedures. Section 6.3 shows how the sample 
firms’ location decisions are related to this framework. Several examples are 
used to demonstrate the role of tax and nontax considerations in location de- 
cisions. In Section 6.4, the emphasis shifts to sourcing decisions, transfer 
prices, and performance measures. Section 6.5 summarizes the major find- 
ings. 
6.1  Conceptual Framework for Analysis 
Two research areas motivate the analysis: (1) strategy research, where taxes 
are acknowledged in passing as important but tax features central to interna- 
tional tax planning and location decisions are usually absent; (2) tax research, 
where the consequences of nontax considerations are recognized but not ex- 
5. The sample firms were selected because they have facilities in low-tax countries and the 
conventional wisdom is that tax-haven firms set transfer prices aggressively. While some of the 
sample firms’ managers admit to transfer pricing aggressively (particularly in the past), they em- 
phasize that they mean aggressively relative to other firms and that their transfer prices are within 
acceptable bounds. In this paper, I use the modifier “aggressively” in this relative sense. 
6. Labor and capital, the central factors in location decision models proposed by many econo- 
mists, are also very important considerations, but, like taxes, they do not tell the whole story. 198  G. Peter Wilson 
plored sufficiently to fully explain location and sourcing decisions. Although 
this study embraces both research areas, the primary objective is to extend the 
tax literature. Specifically, the objective is to identify the frictions, or equiva- 
lently  nontax  issues,  associated  with  location and  sourcing decisions and 
show how they affect tax planning. The strategy literature discusses many of 
these nontax issues. 
In Porter’s global strategy theory, firms gain competitive advantage in two 
ways: by determining where their facilities are located and by  coordinating 
their dispersed activities. These activities include all the elements in firms’ 
value chains: research and development, various manufacturing stages, mar- 
keting, distribution, and certain administrative activities. Porter argues that in 
configuring worldwide activities, firms must first decide whether to concen- 
trate activities in a few nations or to disperse them to many nations. Second, 
firms must decide where to locate these activities. Porter argues that the con- 
centration versus dispersion decision differs across value-chain activities. In 
addition to choosing whether or not to concentrate and where to locate, firms 
must also decide where to decouple their value chains. For example, presum- 
ing a firm elects to concentrate development and manufacturing, it must still 
decide whether to couple these value-chain activities-locate  them together. I 
refer to the nontax considerations that fuse different types of value-chain activ- 
ities (such as marketing and manufacturing) or that concentrate a specific ac- 
tivity  (such as manufacturing) in a few locations as coupling frictions and 
coupling restrictions. Coupling frictions include, but are not limited to, tech- 
nology  constraints,  transportation costs,  company  culture,  the need  to  be 
close to customers, and the need to concentrate manufacturing in a few world- 
scale plants to compete on cost. For example, in developing drugs, certain 
intermediate chemicals are not stable enough to transport or can only be trans- 
ported after costly environmental testing. If  an intermediate chemical could 
be produced efficiently in a low-tax country but the entire compound were too 
costly to produce there (relative to alternative sites), then the coupling fric- 
tions that make it too costly would preclude locating any manufacturing in the 
low-tax  country.  Coupling restrictions  are government rules  that  make  it 
costly or impossible for firms to decouple value-chain activities. Such rules 
include duties, import restrictions, local content requirements, and (in some 
industries) product and price regulatory authority. For example, high duties 
can, de facto, force companies to manufacture close to their markets. 
Even if a firm can completely decouple its value chain at low cost, it will 
not locate activities in low-tax countries if the nontax costs of doing so exceed 
the tax benefits. Country frictions (or country-specific factors) are the oppor- 
tunity cost of locating a value-chain activity, or collection of  activities, in  a 
particular country relative to the next best alternative location (ignoring differ- 
ences in tax benefits in the two locations). Thus, just as coupling frictions and 
restrictions are related to concentration and dispersing strategies, country fric- 199  The Role of  Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
tions are related to location strategies. Depending on the value-chain activity, 
country frictions include the differences across countries in factors such as the 
labor force, infrastructure, political stability, proximity to markets, and finan- 
cial systems. Typically, a country will have a relative advantage in one or more 
of the requisite resources for a facility but a comparative disadvantage (high 
friction) in others. 
sures, are used to motivate divisional managers and to align corporate and 
local planning. Just as companies sometimes sacrifice operating conditions to 
locate in tax havens, they will also use inferior coordination mechanisms (that 
is, mechanisms that are inferior before tax considerations) to facilitate tax 
planning when the benefits from doing so exceed the costs. Coordination  fric- 
tions are the opportunity cost of using a coordination mechanism relative to 
the next-best alternative (ignoring differences in tax benefits). For example, 
the opportunity cost of using transfer prices that are based on tax considera- 
tions rather than those that are based on nontax considerations include forgone 
operating efficiencies. Like the other frictions,  coordination frictions arise 
when there are conflicts between tax and nontax considerations. Of particular 
interest in this study, firms must coordinate sourcing decisions in such a way 
as to  maximize  corporate after-tax income.  These sourcing decisions fre- 
quently involve trading off higher operating costs for lower taxes. 
Countries also play their own strategies. They want to attract high-value 
facilities and benefit from these facilities as much as possible, either through 
high wages, taxes, or other means. Countries with large developed markets, 
such as Japan, or potentially large markets, such as China or India, use duties, 
import restrictions, price regulations, or local-content restrictions to induce 
companies to manufacture locally. Essentially, they exert their market lever- 
age to prevent companies from locating facilities in lower-cost countries. In 
the process, they can extract an additional return on a resource, their market, 
either by taxing these manufacturing facilities or through wages, et cetera. In 
contrast, countries that do not have large markets or do not have unique man- 
ufacturing capability frequently compete for companies by  offering tax  or 
other incentives. 
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6.2  Sample Selection 
This section briefly explains the sample selection and interview procedures 
and describes some characteristics of the sample firms. The research strategy 
was to identify firms with manufacturing facilities in both low- and high-tax 
countries and to study their location and sourcing decisions. Fourteen firms 
with manufacturing facilities in Ireland, Singapore, or Puerto Rico were con- 
tacted; nine agreed to participate, including three pharmaceuticals, three sem- 
iconductor companies, and one company each from chemicals, specialty ma- 200  G. Peter Wilson 
terials, and software. The emphasis on semiconductors and pharmaceuticals 
is intentional. These industries have significant presence in low-tax countries 
and are known to have sophisticated tax departments. Firms from other indus- 
tries,  although  interesting  in  their own  right,  were  included primarily  as 
benchmarks. Thus, the sample is biased toward firms that traditionally have 
been regarded as aggressive tax planners.  As indicated earlier, this bias is 
reflected in the fact that all of the firms are in excess foreign tax limitation, 
although most claim to be close to an excess credit position. Because these 
firms are in excess foreign tax limitation, their tax planning is probably differ- 
ent from that of  other firms. However, foreign tax credit issues per se did not 
appear to affect most of the decisions studied. Many of these decisions were 
made prior to the Tax Reform Act of  1986, when there was less concern about 
being  in  an excess credit position.  Also,  when  managers were questioned 
about how  their foreign tax  credit position affected recent decisions, they 
downplayed its importance. 
Three of  the sample firms’ 1990 sales exceeded $5 billion, six had sales 
greater than $750 million, and one had sales of  less than $100 million. Re- 
search and development as a percentage of sales exceeded 9 percent for most 
of the sample; the exceptions were the chemical and materials companies. 
Two visits were made to most of  the firms. The primary objective of  the 
first trip was to identify the most important tax and nontax factors that firms 
consider when making location and sourcing decisions. Managers from sev- 
eral functional areas were interviewed, usually including the chief financial 
officer and high-level managers from manufacturing, treasury, and strategy. 
For each firm, I began by asking managers to identify the important issues in 
location and sourcing decisions. Follow-up questions queried whether man- 
agers had made sacrifices when their company elected to locate a facility in, 
or source from, a low-tax country. I soon discovered that I learned more when 
I asked managers to discuss recent decisions. Invariably, these discussions 
revealed important issues that had not surfaced earlier and were not covered 
in my preplanned questions. Seven of the firms were revisited to resolve open 
issues. 
For the nine sample firms, sixty-eight location decisions were considered 
in some detail, and approximately thirty of these were discussed extensively. 
Although the years in which these decisions were made were not recorded in 
all cases, at least seven decisions were made during the 1960s, seven during 
the 1970s, four from 1980 through 1985, and twenty after 1985. Forty-seven 
decisions concerned manufacturing facilities, fourteen administrative, finan- 
cial,  or  distribution centers,  one R&D facility, and  six marketing  centers. 
These facilities are spread throughout the world, including the United States, 
Puerto Rico, and twenty-four other countries. Thus, while the sample firms 
were initially chosen because they have some facilities in low-tax countries, 
this geographic dispersion indicates that taxes do not dictate all of their loca- 
tion decisions. 201  The Role of  Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
6.3  Location Decisions 
This section uses examples to demonstrate how the sample firms make lo- 
cation decisions within the framework discussed in section 6.1. Section 6.3.1 
is a lengthy examination of manufacturing location decisions, the issue that 
dominated most of the interviews. Section 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 briefly consider 
marketing and administrative centers. Research and development (R&D) is 
not examined separately because these decisions were discussed infrequently 
during the interviews. 
6.3.1  Manufacturing 
The examples in this subsection demonstrate how coupling frictions, gross 
margins, and country frictions, restrictions, and tax and financial incentives 
affect manufacturing location  decision^.^ In the first part, I consider location 
decisions in the pharmaceutical industry. In this industry, gross margins are 
extremely high because operating risks are high, because the harvest period is 
short-patents  expire shortly after products are launched-and  because most 
costs have been incurred and expensed before manufacturing commences. For 
the pharmaceutical industry, manufacturing coupling frictions are relatively 
minor, while government restrictions profoundly influence location and sourc- 
ing decisions. Next I consider decisions in the semiconductor industry. In this 
industry, gross margins (for microprocessors) are higher than in most indus- 
tries but lower than the pharmaceutical industry, harvest periods are short be- 
cause of  technological obsolescence, and government coupling restrictions 
are important but typically not binding. Manufacturing costs are higher for 
semiconductor than for pharmaceutical companies, primarily because wafer 
fabrication facilities (fabs) are so expensive to build and operate. But, as in 
pharmaceuticals, the bulk of  the expenses are incurred prior to the start of 
manufacturing. Also,  manufacturing facilities require a more sophisticated 
infrastructure. Thus, in the semiconductor industry, country frictions play an 
important role in fab location decisions. I consider a single location in the 
chemical industry, where gross margins are relatively low compared to phar- 
maceuticals and semiconductors. Thus, tax considerations are less important 
in location decisions. Then I examine a software company where coupling, 
coordination, and country frictions and foreign government restrictions are 
essentially nonexistent. Here, taxes are the driver for location decisions and 
U.S. tax restrictions are a counterbalancing force. The other extreme-a  ma- 
terials company where coupling frictions force manufacturing facilities to lo- 
cate in close proximity to customers and taxes are relatively unimportant con- 
sideration-is  discussed last. 
7.  Section 6.4.1  contains an explanation for why firms with larger gross margins typically have 
more flexibility in setting transfer prices. 202  G. Peter Wilson 
Pharmaceuticals 
Success in the pharmaceutical industry depends on a company’s ability to 
discover effective new drugs, get them through the regulatory approval pro- 
cesses in various countries, and market them quickly to harvest profits before 
their patents expire. Although manufacturing costs have been increasing re- 
cently, they are small for most drugs, compared to the estimated $200 million 
to $350 million required to get a drug through R&D and regulatory approval. 
Likewise,  manufacturing costs pale in comparison to the forgone revenues 
when patents expire. For blockbuster drugs, with peak sales approaching a 
billion dollars a year, the lost revenues from delaying a product launch can be 
staggering. As one sourcing manager noted, “Manufacturing can never afford 
to be the bottleneck, because the relative costs of manufacturing are too low.” 
Notwithstanding these relatively  low  manufacturing costs,  the  location of 
manufacturing facilities is still important for regulatory, duty, and tax reasons. 
Regulatory considerations are broadly  defined in  this paper.  They  include 
product approvals, government price approvals, and, increasingly, environ- 
mental and safety issues.8 
Price approval is a particularly important consideration in location deci- 
sions because,  unlike  the  United  States,  most  governments regulate drug 
prices.  Industry sources indicate that companies frequently negotiate price 
increases in exchange for local manufacturing. In this regard, price increases 
substitute, albeit imperfectly, for tax benefits as incentives to lure manufactur- 
ing sites. Similarly, lower prices substitute for higher taxes and duties as the 
admission price that some countries command for access to attractive markets. 
Perhaps countries prefer prices to taxes as a policy instrument because it is 
easier to  target preferential  treatment for  specific drugs by  using  product 
prices.  Alternatively, tax  breaks may  not be  as valuable to multinationals, 
such as the sample firms, that are in excess foreign tax limitation. 
Timing the grants of regulatory approvals across different countries is also 
important. Ultimately, pharmaceuticals must secure price and product approv- 
als in all of their markets, but the approval processes differ dramatically across 
countries. Countries that approve a drug quickly, for example, might offer a 
lower price in exchange for a longer harvest peri~d.~  However, it is not always 
advantageous to push for quick approval in those countries. Because other 
countries peg prices to those set elsewhere, it can be costly to get a drug 
8. In  the pharmaceutical industry, environmental and safety considerations  are becoming more 
important in explaining location and sourcing decisions. Some countries, especially in Europe, do 
not allow intermediate chemicals to be transported in large quantities unless they pass stringent, 
time-consuming, and  costly  safety tests.  This creates a coupling restriction (manufacturing is 
fused to markets) and helps explain why pharmaceutical companies are consolidating their Euro- 
pean manufacturing operations. 
9. Strictly speaking, countries do not explicitly trade off  quicker product approvals for lower 
prices. Product and price approvals are negotiated separately with different authorities in  each 
country. However, the outcomes from these negotiations are consistent with such a trade-off. 203  The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
through product approval quickly in a low-price country. Accordingly, com- 
panies strategically select the countries where they get early approvals. 
Approval in the United States by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
is usually the most difficult and time consuming to secure of all countries.I0 
Also, until recently, a drug could not be exported from the United States until 
it was approved here, even if  it was approved elsewhere. This meant that, 
historically,  American  companies  had  a  strong  incentive  to  manufacture 
abroad. Recent legislation that allows an American company to export to one 
of twenty developed countries where the drug is approved has partially miti- 
gated this incentive. Now,  pharmaceuticals have an incentive to quickly get 
approval in at least one of these twenty countries, either to start manufacturing 
in the United States for the U.S. market before they get U.S. approval or to 
manufacture abroad for approved countries. 
During the regulatory approval process, pharmaceutical companies decide 
where they are going to produce the drug.ll They can readily split production 
into distinct steps because coupling frictions within the manufacturing stages 
are relatively small. For dry products, such as the drug exemplified in figure 
6.1 (discussed shortly), the manufacturing stages include bulk chemical pro- 
duction  (developing  standard inorganic compounds),  active ingredient  pro- 
duction (further developing the chemical compound specific to a drug), dis- 
persion  (diluting  the  active  ingredient  by  granulation  and  mixing),  tablet 
production  (forming and coating the tablets), and fill/finishing (bottling, la- 
beling, boxing, and palletizing). Except for the chemical stages, country fric- 
tions associated with manufacturing are also relatively small; once the active 
ingredient is produced, the remaining manufacturing stages do not require a 
sophisticated infrastructure.  l2 
Figure 6.1 shows a representative  sourcing pattern for a successful drug 
distributed by one of the sample firms. The subsequent discussion illustrates 
10. In the United States, the three-phased process starts when a new molecule, referred to as a 
new chemical entity (NCE), is discovered and patented. Phase I generally takes about three years 
and emphasizes safety tests on lower species such as mice. Phase 11,  which can be done simulta- 
neously with Phase I, focuses on whether the product works. After these phases are complete, 
extensive documentation is submitted to the FDA as part of an investigative new drug application 
(IND) to get permission to try the drug on humans. Extensive clinical tests on humans, carefully 
monitored by the FDA, are conducted in Phase 111. At the end of Phase 111,  a new drug application 
(NDA) is submitted to the FDA along with a “truckload’ of supporting data. The entire approval 
process typically takes eight to thirteen years. 
1 1. Traditionally, these location and sourcing decisions were made toward the end of the prod- 
uct approval process.  However, because of recent changes in the U.S. product approval process, 
these decisions must now be  made considerably earlier. Currently, manufacturing sites must be 
operating and pass strict regulatory hurdles before a product is approved. 
12. Although the sample firms have made numerous location decisions during recent years, 
they have not established new chemical sites. Nevertheless,  they did indicate that the decision 
process for bulk chemical facilities was considerably more thorough than for new drugs and that 
taxes and financial incentives play a larger role in these decisions. From what I learned in casual 
discussions,  these bulk chemical decisions resemble those discussed later for the bulk chemical 
and semiconductor wafer fabrication manufacturing facilities. Accordingly, the remainder of this 
section considers the nonchemical manufacturing stages only. 204  G. Peter Wilson 
Fig. 6.1  A representative sourcing pattern for a successful drug 
how regulatory, duty, and tax considerations influenced where the company 
located various manufacturing stages. Manufacturing starts in a major Euro- 
pean country, where a bulk chemical facility that supports several other drugs 
produces the initial compound. This is subsequently converted to the active 
ingredient in a new facility that cost over $40 million. The new facility has an 
annual output of 150 to 200 kilos which, when diluted in a stabilizer for trans- 
porting, yields twelve to fifteen metric tons. Because the output from the ex- 
isting bulk chemical plant is potentially unstable and could cause environmen- 
tal or safety problems if transported and because the required infrastructure to 
support the new and existing plant are similar, the new facility was  located 
adjacent to the bulk chemical plant. More generally, coupling frictions in the 
production of the active ingredient are typically too large to justify multiple 
locations. However, the company could have located the new facility adjacent 
to a bulk chemical facility in the United States. They chose the European site 
for regulatory approval reasons. By producing outside of  the United States, 
they were able to extend the harvest period on non-U.S. sales by one year. As 
noted earlier, the marginal revenues from a longer harvest period can dwarf all 
other considerations. The original decision to locate the bulk chemical facility 
in this particular European country was, however, influenced by both tax ben- 
efits and country frictions. 
By the time the drug is in pill form, the twelve to fifteen metric tons of 205  The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
stabilized active ingredient will be further diluted by a factor of one thousand. 
As  indicated in  figure 6.1, dispersing,  tablet production, and  fill/finishing 
have been decoupled, and multiple facilitates are used for each stage. As we 
shall see, the benefits from this arrangement exceed the related coupling fric- 
tions, including transportation costs and forgone economies of  scale. More- 
over, this company has reduced the transportation costs by  locating the dis- 
persing facilities close to the tablet production facilities. Taxes, duties, and a 
desire to service particular markets from a single location explain the remain- 
ing manufacturing sites in figure 6.1. 
The top box in the third column of the figure represents a dispersion facility 
in a major ALADI country. The ALADI is a trade agreement among several 
Latin  American  countries  that  reduces  duties on  trades  among  members. 
There is, for example, a 102 percent import duty on tablets entering Brazil 
from the United  States but only a  10 percent duty if  the product is partly 
manufactured in an ALADI country.  I3 The ALADI agreement largely explains 
why tablets for Latin America are manufactured and subsequently distributed 
as indicated in figure 6.1. Again, country restrictions rather than frictions or 
taxes are dictating a site location. 
The “Asian country” dispersion, tablet, and packaging facilities that start 
in column 3 and the Argentinian facilities that start in column 4 were largely 
tax motivated. However, the sourcing manager for this company cautioned 
that the company had paid dearly for these tax benefits and, given the same 
opportunities, would probably not repeat these decisions. Duties are high in 
the Asian country so, absent tax benefits, the company had an incentive to 
locate facilities there. Nonetheless, they now regret the decision to locate in a 
tax-favored zone. “The location is physically beautiful but it is located in the 
middle of nowhere.” The labor pool is “totally inadequate,” and the company 
cannot get executives to live there even though they have built homes at the 
site. The $7 million facility, which produces other drugs besides the one in 
figure 6.1, runs at only 20 percent capacity. Similarly, the sourcing manager 
said that the company recently had sold the Argentinian facility because it was 
too  inefficient.  “When I  finally  arrived at the plant,  I thought that  I had 
reached the edge of civilization.” When queried as to why these manufactur- 
ing inefficiencies were not identified earlier by a location team, the sourcing 
manager indicated that historically the decision process was very informal for 
these relatively minor manufacturing facilities. “Local management in both 
Argentina and the Asian country heard about tax breaks, and corporate man- 
agement trusted  their judgment.” He also indicated that the company had 
learned some valuable lessons from these experiences, noting that in the fu- 
ture they will scrutinize country frictions more carefully before they jump at 
tax breaks. This example demonstrates that even though country frictions are 
minor for these facilities, they are important and must be identified prior to 
13. Thus, the duty savings is on the value added in Mexico. 206  G.  Peter Wilson 
the location decision. Other sample firms also reported that they have learned 
to identify and carefully scrutinize country-specific factors (frictions) before 
they jump at tax breaks. 
The Puerto Rican facilities that start in the third column were also largely 
tax motivated, but the country frictions in the Asian-country and Argentinian 
tax-favored zones are not present. l4  More generally, the sample pharmaceuti- 
cal companies agree that the country frictions (opportunity costs) of manufac- 
turing in Puerto Rico are relatively low.  Although,  they would probably not 
“put any new roofs”  in Puerto Rico absent the tax breaks,  the incremental 
costs of producing  there (rather than in the next-best location) are small. In 
particular,  during the past twenty years, the Puerto Rican infrastructure has 
improved  significantly.  Modem four-lane  highways  have replaced  two-lane 
roads clogged with farm machinery; the labor force is more sophisticated be- 
cause the educational system has improved dramatically; and the managers, 
who are now Puerto Ricans rather than expatriates, have twenty years of ex- 
perience managing people and operations. 
Because  there are no duties  on imports  from Puerto  Rico to the  United 
States and there are generous tax breaks for producing there, it is not surpris- 
ing that most prescription drugs sold in the United States are at least partially 
produced  in  Puerto Rico.  Indeed, some drugs are completely  produced  in 
Puerto Rico, including the active ingredients. However, as indicated in figure 
6.1,  U. S. pharmaceutical  companies  also  have  significant  manufacturing 
presence outside of Puerto Rico. Why? Because other countries, with large or 
potentially large markets, impose coupling restrictions,  including duties and 
the threat of lower selling prices. These restrictions, not taxes, frequently ex- 
plain why manufacturing  facilities are located outside the United States and 
Puerto  Rico.15 Taxes  are  still  considered  when  U.S.  pharmaceutical  firms 
must decide where to manufacture.  Their short list of site alternatives usually 
includes a low-tax country such as Puerto Rico or Ireland, and they have sig- 
nificant manufacturing capacity in both of these countries. But frequently the 
tax benefits are not sufficient to compensate for the costs associated with the 
14. The Tax Reform Act of  1976 included  0936, which has two major provisions.  First,  it 
grants U.S. corporations a 100 percent credit equal to (and therefore fully offsetting) the U.S. tax 
both on income earned in the active conduct of a trade or business in a possession and on qualified 
possession source investment income (which is nonbusiness income earned and invested within 
the possession).  Second, 0936 exempts the corporation from U.S. tax on any dividends remitted 
to the U.S.  parent. Before 1982, there were no explicit statutory guidelines on the proper alloca- 
tion of  costs and profits between a U.S. parent and its possession subsidiaries.  Under the Tax 
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of  1982, Congress provided two alternative methods for 
allocating profits from intangibles. In the example in this paper, the pharmaceutical company uses 
the profit-split method that allocates 50 percent of the profit to both the parent and subsidiary. 
Apparently, this method is popular because it reduces the risk of litigation. 
15. For expositional convenience, lower prices are considered restrictions that countries use to 
promote local manufacturing. The intent here is not to argue that these prices are lower than those 
that would obtain in a competitive market. Rather, they are lower than those that would obtain if 
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coupling restrictions. The ALADI duties provides an example of these gov- 
ernment coupling restrictions. The price approval process considered next is 
another coupling restriction that has a major impact on location decisions. 
Several factors explain the fill/finishing  facilities in figure 6.1. To gain price 
and regulatory approval, some countries require that fill/finishing activities be 
done locally, and independent of  this restriction, foreign sales offices prefer 
this local presence for marketing purposes. In addition, sample firms indi- 
cated that many of their tablet and fill/finish facilities are obtained when they 
acquire foreign companies to gain access to local markets. 
Note that for the drug in figure 6.1 all manufacturing stages for the Euro- 
pean market take place in a single European country. Recent regulatory em- 
phasis on manufacturing and safety and increased pressure on profit margins 
from competitive forces in Europe have encouraged firms to consolidate op- 
erations to capture economies of scale. Ten years ago, the European sourcing 
pattern would have looked quite different. In particular, there might have been 
multiple dispersion and tablet facilities and multiple fill/finishing facilities 
spread throughout Europe for this one drug. At  that time, companies com- 
pleted the final stages of production for several drugs in each European coun- 
try. The number of stages located in each country was largely determined by 
the country’s negotiating position. 
What has caused this change in manufacturing strategy? With the establish- 
ment of  a common European market, coupling restrictions, in the form of 
duties and import restrictions, have been removed. Relaxing these restrictions 
allows pharmaceuticals to  consolidate operations to  capture economies of 
scale.  Recall,  however, that there is another coupling restriction that fuses 
manufacturing and markets; countries can threaten lower drug prices to lure 
manufacturing. Historically, companies responded by  locating minor manu- 
facturing stages for each drug in several European countries. Now, some coun- 
tries offer price increases for several products in exchange for an agreement to 
establish a single-drug facility that will serve all of Europe. This compensates 
for lower prices a pharmaceutical might receive in other countries. Further- 
more, as European markets expand and pharmaceuticals assume a global per- 
spective, American companies want  to have a local presence. In  addition, 
regulatory authorities both in the United States and abroad are imposing strict 
manufacturing requirements that can be met more efficiently in single-purpose 
facilities. 
In summary, both  tax  and nontax  factors influence most pharmaceutical 
manufacturing location decisions. Government restrictions, including duties, 
local-content rules,  and regulatory approval, are the most important nontax 
factors. To  a lesser extent, coupling frictions, such as transportation costs and 
environmental and safety considerations, and country frictions, such as infra- 
structure quality, also matter. Likewise, tax benefits influence these decisions, 
particularly in Puerto Rico, where coupling restrictions are minor (there are 
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low. Pharmaceuticals also locate facilities in Ireland, although to a lesser ex- 
tent than in  Puerto Rico, to get both tax benefits and a stronger European 
presence. However, as illustrated in the example, nontax factors also explain 
many site selections. Furthermore, during the past twenty years, the relative 
importance of various nontax factors has changed, and nontax factors overall 
have assumed greater importance in decisions. As one manager noted, 
In the past, taxes were the primary driver, but as we become more global 
we are paying more attention to three other factors: (1) our desire to have a 
manufacturing presence in our key markets, (2) price breaks that we get in 
exchange for locating facilities in specific countries, and (3) economies of 
scale that can be gained either in a tax haven or in another country but not 
in both. Nevertheless, there are big bucks in tax, and these other consider- 
ations must be quite large to offset the tax benefits. 
Semiconductors 
Semiconductor products  include  both  high-volume  commodity  chips, 
where the competitive emphasis is on minimizing production costs, and mi- 
croprocessors, were the emphasis is on product innovation.  l6 Successful mi- 
croprocessors have relatively high gross margins. Like pharmaceuticals, the 
business is risky and the harvest periods are short. The short harvest periods, 
however, are due to product obsolescence rather than patents expiring. Still, 
semiconductor companies have lower gross margins than pharmaceuticals, 
partly because they sell more low-margin products such as memory chips but 
also because their sales and marketing expenses, which do not affect gross 
margin calculations, are lower and their cost of goods sold, which does affect 
gross margin calculations, is higher.  Nevertheless, there are important dif- 
ferences between semiconductor and pharmaceutical firms: the semiconductor 
industry experiences more extreme fluctuations in demand; success depends 
more on manufacturing innovation and expertise; the manufacturing learning 
curve is steeper; and the transfer of this learning from high-volume to proprie- 
tary products is more important.’* 
16. This description of the semiconductor industry is highly simplified. For additional details, 
an excellent reference is Yoffie (1987). 
17. Semiconductor  innovation depends on costly advancements in  manufacturing equipment 
that must be upgraded frequently. This translates into high depreciation charges and, thus, high 
cost of goods sold. In contrast, while bulk chemical facilities for pharmaceuticals are costly, the 
upgrade costs are considerably less. 
18. Yoffie (1987, 6) discusses the importance of  learning in semiconductor manufacturing: 
“One of the reasons that learning produced such dividends was that semiconductor manufacturing 
routinely yielded more defects than sound products. For new products, yields as low as 10 percent 
for inexperienced manufacturers, and 25 percent for experienced manufacturers were quite com- 
mon. For more mature products, however, yields could be as high as 90  percent. The need to raise 
yields led firms to manufacture high-volume products that could act as ‘technology drivers.’ It 
was generally believed that skills learned in  manufacturing large volumes of  a simple product 
could be transferred to lower-volume and higher-value-added devices and help ‘drive’ the firm 
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Semiconductor manufacturing  has  three stages: wafer  fabrication (fab), 
where millions of electronic building blocks are embedded in a small silicon 
wafer  using  highly  advanced technology; assembly, where  the  wafers  are 
“diced” into chips and mounted onto a frame; and testing, where the chips are 
checked for accuracy (Carolin et al. 1984). The coupling frictions across these 
manufacturing stages are minimal. For example, at all stages, the output is 
very light and can be easily transported. “Our products have a lot of mileage 
on them,”  stated one manager,  explaining that wafers are produced  in  the 
United  States, shipped to one Asian  country where they  are converted to 
chips,  sent to a more developed Asian country for testing, returned to the 
United States for packaging, and finally distributed worldwide.  l9 
Until very recently, assembly and test location decisions have been largely 
determined by labor costs and taxes. Assembly required relatively low skilled 
labor and basic materials that were both available in many countries. Asian 
sites were chosen because they offered the best labor at the lowest price and 
very attractive tax incentives. Similarly, test facilities were located in Asia but 
in  more  developed  countries  such  as  Singapore  because  testing  requires 
medium-skilled labor. Taxes were very important in these decisions, but gen- 
erally they were not pivotal. Commonly, a firm might negotiate for and re- 
ceive  very  generous tax  benefits  including an  eight-year tax  holiday that 
would start when production reached a specified level; an agreement that pre- 
holiday losses could be offset against postholiday gains; a reduction of  the 
postholiday tax rate in exchange for locating in a specified zone; an acceler- 
ated depreciation schedule and generous investment credits that would also 
offset postholiday gains; and permanent exemption for all other taxes. Some 
of  the sample firms stated that they plan to extend these tax holidays in the 
future by  adding additional facilities. In addition to these tax benefits, the 
company often received training allowances, exemptions from duties, flexi- 
bility in setting their legal and financial structures, capital allowances, and a 
generous financing package.  Notwithstanding all of  these tax and financial 
incentives, the company’s choice was largely based on nontax considerations, 
essentially because comparable tax benefits were available in competing coun- 
tries. Also, semiconductor managers emphasize that the most important con- 
siderations for  their  test  and  assembly  decisions have  been  the  technical 
knowledge of the local work force; available local raw materials, especially 
chemicals and indirect materials, political stability; and, more generally, low 
operating costs. Recently, automation has become more important for test and 
assembly, and firms are beginning to consider single locations for all three 
manufacturing stages. If  this becomes a trend, fab location choices will dic- 
tate where companies locate manufacturing. 
Fabs, in contrast to assembly and test, require resources found in relatively 
few countries.  These resources include a highly educated and stable work 
19. Recently, the sample semiconductor firms began combining assembly and test facilities. 210  G.  Peter Wilson 
force to achieve and maintain high yields, political stability to ensure that the 
large capital outlays are not expropriated, a strong legal system to defend 
against technology transfers, local support from vendors to maintain the so- 
phisticated equipment, large quantities of pure water, and consistent electric- 
ity. Countries with the requisite resources typically have relatively high statu- 
tory tax rates. For most manufacturers, these taxes can be viewed as the rental 
rates they pay for the sophisticated infrastructure. Yet,  many countries com- 
pete aggressively, using tax benefits and other financial incentives to lure fabs. 
The decision process for locating a fab is similar for all of the sample sem- 
iconductor firms. More generally, these fab decisions illustrate the way most 
of the sample firms make location decisions requiring large capital expendi- 
tures. Each of the sample semiconductor firms has built at least one fab in the 
United States during the past ten years after giving serious consideration to 
foreign sites. As one manager said, “We prefer to keep fabs close to home 
because they require a lot of  nurturing.” Nevertheless, all three have either 
recently built or have plans to build fabs abroad. The following is a represent- 
ative composite discussion about how these decisions are made. 
The location decision is generally sparked by capacity requirements rather 
than marketing considerations. In this example, a European division informed 
the international semiconductor group during the 1980s that it needed addi- 
tional capacity and suggested building a fab in Europe to avoid a 17 percent 
duty.  Because the company is highly decentralized, the European division, 
under the guidance of the International Group, began the search process for a 
European site.  After considerable deliberation, to be discussed shortly, the 
European division recommended a specific European country to the Intema- 
tional Group. Shortly after the International Group recommended this site to 
the sector level, a U.S. semiconductor division began lobbying vigorously for 
an American site. At this point, a contest ensued between the U.S. and inter- 
national groups.2o 
When the European division started their site search for this $250 million 
facility (estimated replacement cost in 1990 was $500 million), they quickly 
narrowed  their short list to West  Germany, France,  Scotland, and Ireland. 
Each site had tax and nontax benefits, and country officials aggressively sold 
their advantages. Ireland offered generous tax  and financial benefits,*’ but 
management was concerned at that time that Northern Ireland might be too 
unstable politically and that Southern Ireland might lack the requisite infra- 
structure, including equipment vendors. Like Ireland, Scotland had a lower 
tax rate than West Germany or France and offered other tax and financial ben- 
20. In many respects,  this example is representative of how large capital outlay decisions are 
made. However, the smaller centralized firms do not conduct these contests. Rather, corporate 
managers serve on the location teams and are actively involved at all stages of the decision pro- 
cess. 
21. Management did not specify whether these benefits were offered by  Northern or Southern 
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efits. More important, both Ireland and Scotland were deemed to have a flex- 
ible labor force and lower wage rate. A manager commented: “We wanted to 
feel comfortable, and governments are easy to work with in the United King- 
dom. The semiconductor business is cyclical, and when business turns down 
it is easier to adjust in Scotland and Ireland than in other European countries.” 
These advantages for Scotland and Ireland had to be weighed against higher 
productivity in West Germany and France. At this point, the European group 
made its recommendation. 
The contest between the U.S. and European sites centered on differences in 
technology bases,  proximity to customers, and financial considerations in- 
cluding duties, grants, and taxes. The financial considerations weighed heav- 
ily in favor of  Europe. The European country offered generous incentives, 
including a large cash rebate on fixed asset expenditures, a training grant, and 
a discretionary grant that was added as a sweetener. As indicated earlier, the 
17 percent duty rate (on European sales) also put the U.S.  site at a major 
disadvantage. Aside from these financial advantages, the European site was 
favored because management felt that European customers would be more 
comfortable buying from a local supplier. The U.S. site had one major advan- 
tage. Its technology base and local infrastructure were superior to the Euro- 
pean site. As a result,  management felt that it would achieve higher yields 
more quickly. 
How were these considerations weighed? Like most of  the sample firms, 
this company uses a blend of science and art in such a process. They begin 
with  a  sophisticated  quantitative  analysis-actually  several  spreadsheets. 
Given estimated demands for several products, the spreadsheets account for 
equipment requirements and related expenditures, a time series of yield pro- 
jections, local labor requirements and costs, local duties, local utilities, trans- 
portation costs to get the product to market, taxes, and grants.22  The output, 
an internal rate of return (IRR) for each site, reflects the firm’s transfer pricing 
policy and the duration of the tax benefits.23  Although the quantitative analy- 
22. Some of the sample firms were asked whether they preferred grants, investment tax credits, 
or lower tax rates at all levels of income. A semiconductor firm responded that they prefer lower 
tax rates because, “If you use investment incentives, then your marginal tax rate depends on how 
much you continue to invest.” In contrast, the chemical company prefers grants and tax incentives. 
“Grants in the form of  cash from the government or investment tax credits are perhaps more 
important in making location decisions because, on a net present value basis, the grants may lower 
the cost of the plant sufficiently to offset a lower tax rate. In determining which is more important, 
the cost of the plant and profitability of  the product are significant factors. If the product is more 
capital intensive, grants generally are more important. If the product is a high value added product 
because of technology, tax rates would be more important.” Finally, a pharmaceutical company 
stated, “Because our foreign plants are not capital intensive, we prefer low rates to capital incen- 
tives. We are also very concerned about the duration of the low tax rates.” 
23. A tax manager emphasized that the transfer prices do not depend on the location. “We use 
uniform transfer prices for all location decisions.” Also, even though this firm has been very 
successful at extending tax holidays, they do not include possible extensions in their IRR calcula- 
tions. 212  G. Peter Wilson 
sis plays a role in the decision process, it is best viewed as a vehicle for an- 
choring the discussion. Qualitative considerations, including concerns about 
political stability, potential to penetrate a market, availability of vendors, and 
other infrastructure issues mentioned earlier, often dominate the quantitative 
analysis. 
What was the role of taxes in this decision? One manager emphasized that 
even though taxes are an important consideration, tax benefits are short lived: 
“In the long run, tax  incentives and government grants go away, but your 
factory stays in place. We  prefer to base our location decisions on our long- 
term business objectives in a country. We try to consciously look at a decision 
to make a major investment in a country, especially a high-tech investment 
such as a fab, without considering tax incentives.” Nevertheless, taxes and 
duties were the critical advantages favoring the particular European site cho- 
sen. More generally, once the list of alternative sites is narrowed to locations 
with comparable country frictions, taxes and duties frequently become tie- 
breakers. Thus, taxes and duties are important in fab location decisions, even 
though managers claim that they are not as important as nontax considera- 
tions. A corporate vice president made a typical comment: “First we decided 
to go to Europe to avoid duties (more recently, local-content requirements), 
and then, given the decision to go to Europe, we located in the lowest-cost 
country (including taxes) where business requirements were satisfied.” 
The contest between the location teams facilitates planning in general, but 
tax planning in particular. For example, consider the role of the corporate tax 
office in the decision. A manager at the International Group said that, while 
they kept the corporate tax office informed of  their plans and occasionally 
received corporate advice, they relied largely on their own tax staff and their 
European counterparts. The European managers, including tax, did the early 
negotiations with various countries and the International Group managers did 
the final negotiations with government officials in the European country. Al- 
though the corporate tax office participated little in the decision (relative to 
more centralized firms), the corporate vice president for tax indicated that his 
office spends considerable effort communicating the corporate tax  position 
(e.g., their foreign tax credit position and their tax profile in various countries) 
and the corporate tax strategy to foreign and sector-level tax managers. Also, 
because location teams compete for sites, each team is motivated to negotiate 
aggressively with local authorities for tax and other benefits and to demon- 
strate how their site benefits overall corporate tax planning. Nevertheless, the 
corporate vice president of tax indicated that the company might get more 
generous tax benefits if  he, like his counterparts in more centralized firms, 
were involved in country negotiations. 
In summary, until recently, location decisions in the semiconductor industry 
have been  strongly influenced by  country frictions and tax  considerations, 
while coupling frictions have been much less important. Prior to the early 
1980s, most fabs (for U.S. firms) were in the United States, and most test and 213  The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
assembly operations were in Asia. More recently, foreign governments have 
imposed  local-content  restrictions  that have encouraged  U.  S. companies to 
build fabs closer to their major markets. Coupling frictions are also becoming 
more important as customers press for local manufacturing. Finally, this sec- 
tion demonstrates that larger decentralized firms use location team contests to 
coordinate more efficient planning. 
Chemicals 
The sample chemical company has significantly lower gross margins than 
the pharmaceutical  and semiconductor firms do. Historically,  it has concen- 
trated production in world-scale plants that each cost approximately $400 mil- 
lion to $500 million (in 1991 dollars) and has competed in commodity mar- 
kets  as  a  low-cost  producer.  More  recently,  it  is  also  seeking  to  gain 
competitive advantage by specializing in more advanced chemicals tailored to 
customers’ needs. As a result, some of their new plants are smaller, with costs 
in the $100 million range. In this industry, unlike pharmaceuticals and semi- 
conductors, transportation  costs are large. Thus, although companies  must 
consolidate  operations  into a few world-scale plants to be competitive, they 
must locate these plants close to their major markets and suppliers to minimize 
transportation  costs. Thus, coupling  frictions are a major  consideration  for 
chemical companies. 
Taxes are less important for chemical company location decisions than they 
are for pharmaceutical  and semiconductor  firms.  Although  chemical facili- 
ties, like fabs, require large capital outlays, they are not as attractive to host 
countries. Generally, chemical facilities demand large quantities of water and 
electricity,  are considered  an environmental  risk, and  have relatively  small 
medium-skilled work forces. As a consequence, although some countries of- 
fer limited tax incentives in the form of rapid depreciation and favorable fi- 
nancing,  these benefits  are thought to be considerably smaller than the ones 
countries offer to lure fabs. Collectively, these modest financial and tax bene- 
fits, the earlier arguments that tax benefits increase as gross margins increase, 
and the large coupling frictions related to transportation costs and economies 
of scale explain why nontax considerations  frequently dictate location deci- 
sions for major chemical facilities.  Nevertheless,  as the following example 
illustrates, even when taxes do not dictate the outcome they are still an impor- 
tant consideration  in the decision process. This example also underscores the 
advantages of expanding an existing location versus starting a new greenfield 
site. This greenfield disadvantage was a factor in many of the location deci- 
sions studied. 
Recently, the sample chemical firm began a search for a site to produce an 
existing product using a new and cheaper process to serve the North American 
market. Transportation  costs quickly  focused  attention on a  Canadian  and 
U.S.  site.  The U.S. site  had  an  advantage  because  it  was  an  expansion, 
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infrastructure capacity (sewage, parking lots); their local management has a 
working relationship with local government, contractors, and suppliers; and 
they have an experienced work force. Furthermore, expansions can be com- 
pleted more quickly than greenfield sites: the infrastructure is in place, build- 
ing permits are easier to acquire,  and building contracts can be completed 
sooner. The higher costs of  a greenfield site are typically too large for any 
single division to  When existing sites are not in low-tax countries, 
these costs effectively increase the opportunity cost of  locating in low-tax 
countries and, thus, increase tax-haven country frictions. In addition to these 
greenfield disadvantages, the Canadian site could not capitalize on a manufac- 
turing synergy available at the U.S. site.25  The Canadian site offered financial 
and tax benefits that were modest compared to those used to lure a fab but 
significant enough to make the decision close.26 
Several rounds of  meetings were conducted that included representatives 
from the  competing location teams and corporate managers.  During each 
round,  according to the vice president of  tax, the location teams upgraded 
their information and renegotiated with local authorities for more benefits. As 
a result, they continually changed the assumptions underlying their net pres- 
ent value calculations (which were based on detailed procedures documented 
in a company manual). At these meetings, the vice president of tax served as 
a referee who attested to the soundness of  the tax  assumptions underlying 
these calculations. He did not meet with local tax authorities, but tax manag- 
ers at both locations, who report functionally to him, operated on his behalf. 
Also, as indicated earlier, the competitive spirit of the geographic teams partly 
compensated for his not participating directly in local tax planning. 
The net present value calculations were comparable for the two sites. In 
these situations, “the tiebreaker is to go to the country where operations are 
most efficient,” said the chief strategist. “The tax benefits are generally short 
run, while the operating benefits continue,” he stated, suggesting, once again, 
that the net present value calculations are not precise enough to capture quali- 
tatively the differences between the locations. The decision to locate in the 
24. In some companies, successful greenfield sites must be promoted by the corporate office in 
conjunction with a corporate strategic initiative. Also, divisions with considerable autonomy over 
location decisions will not usually choose a greenfield site unless the corporate office absorbs part 
of the start-up costs associated with the infrastructure.  For example, the corporate office could 
charge a fee based on the ratio of the division’s requirement to the planned capacity for the entire 
site. Although 1  did not pursue this issue as part of my interview protocol,  the chemical sample 
firm is just now considering this type of fee arrangement. The reason why these fee schedules may 
not be common and, thus, why there is such a first-mover disadvantage to greenfield sites is that 
many firms probably do not or cannot anticipate  future expansions.  Rather, they expand in a 
piecemeal fashion over an  extended period of time. 
25. The new production process uses the heat released in the manufacturing process to produce 
steam that can produce electricity or be used to heat facilities. At the U.S. site, the new facility 
would produce enough of these utilities to service existing operations (that have a net utility de- 
mand). Because there were no immediate plans to add operations that would benefit from these 
utilities at the Canadian site, the U.S. site had an advantage. 
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United States resulted in tax benefits being left on the table because the oppor- 
tunity costs of operating in Canada (country frictions) were too large relative 
to the United States. More generally, because many U.S. firms are just begin- 
ning to expand globally and have excess infrastructure at existing U.S.  sites, 
this  greenfield  friction  (associated  with  foreign  sites) probably  encourages 
U.S.  firms to expand at home. 
Software 
The sample software company,  the smallest firm in the  study, is a recent 
start-up with annual sales approaching $100 million.27  Because manufactur- 
ing costs are very small compared to R&D and marketing costs and because 
software is a risky business, the company’s gross margins are very large. All 
of their software is developed in the United States. The Puerto Rican facility 
transcribes the code to floppy disks and packages the disks for sale. The man- 
ufacturing process is straightforward, so there are virtually no coupling, coun- 
try, or coordination  frictions associated with  these Puerto Rican operations. 
Not surprisingly, the chief financial officer (CFO) stated that taxes are the pri- 
mary driver in location decisions. In fact, when the firm decided to expand 
operations, it chose a short list of sites by requesting a list of low-tax countries 
from an outside tax advisor. The CFO stated that “we decided to go to Puerto 
Rico to get the product with the highest gross margin in the country with the 
lowest tax rates.” 
Scholes and Wolfson predict that, absent frictions, restrictions will be im- 
posed to curb overly aggressive tax planning.  But what is considered overly 
aggressive?  The company uses  strict  statutory  rules to split profit between 
Puerto Rico and the United States, so their transfer prices per se are acceptable 
to the U.S. taxing authorities.  However, the U.S. Treasury argues that many 
Puerto Rican  software  operations  do not  constitute  legitimate  manufactur- 
ing.28  This is a grey area, but although managers at the sample company agree 
that software firms have taken an aggressive tax position,  they also believe 
that Puerto Rican  operations  do constitute  manufacturing.  A  current  court 
case is considering the validity of this claim. If the courts rule in favor of the 
taxing authority, transfer prices will have to be set using a cost-plus formula, 
regardless of where the facilities are located outside the United States. Con- 
sidering the low manufacturing  costs, this will greatly reduce the benefits of 
locating in a low-tax country. 
Materials 
The materials company competes by specializing in niche markets. Its com- 
petitive advantage is that its engineers spend so much time at their customers’ 
27. Although the focus here is on software, the company also sells related hardware that  is 
produced in Asia by third parties. These hardware sales are part of the $100 million figure. 
28. Income that is not derived from manufacturing is deemed subpart F and taxed immediately 
in the United States. Regulation 5 1.954-3(a)(4)  provides general guidelines as to what constitutes 
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facilities that they know the material engineering aspects of their customers’ 
businesses  better  than  the  customers  do.  When  customers’  processing 
changes, because of slight variances in operating conditions or materials, the 
sample company  must  quickly  modify  its products  as  needed.  Of  all  the 
sample firms,  the materials firm had  the largest coupling friction  between 
marketing and manufacturing. In fact, it feels compelled to locate manufac- 
turing facilities as close as possible to its customers. Thus, taxes are a rela- 
tively minor consideration in location decisions. 
The chief financial officer stated that they are more inclined to minimize tax 
barriers among a list of countries that satisfy business conditions than they are 
to go for the tax benefits. For example, the company went to Singapore be- 
cause it wanted to be near customers that were locating facilities in Malaysia 
and Singapore. Once there, it applied for pioneer status for its manufacturing 
operations.  29 
6.3.2  Marketing and Distribution Centers 
This subsection briefly describes two examples of marketing and distribu- 
tion centers that were largely motivated by tax or duty considerations. In the 
first, a sample firm recently established a marketing center in Belgium to shift 
income from high-tax-rate European  countries to the United States without 
changing the income’s foreign-source character.  The Belgian operation was 
set up as a branch of the U.S. parent. The European manufacturing sites pay 
the U.S. parent for marketing services that are rendered in Belgium, and the 
branch pays a small Belgian tax that is based on their administrative expenses. 
The company tries to set the marketing fees as high as the European taxing 
authorities will tolerate. 
In the second example, another sample firm recently established a Euro- 
pean distribution center in the Netherlands, primarily to minimize duties. As 
with the above marketing center, nontax considerations were minimal.3o  Fig- 
ure 6.2 illustrates how goods were invoiced both before and after the new 
center was set up.  Previously, the American  parent  (AP) invoiced  Italy di- 
rectly. Duties were based on the transfer price and the relatively high Italian 
duty rate for American imports.  The company established  a new American 
subsidiary, AP-International, that in turn established a branch in the Nether- 
lands (NB). After the distribution center was set up in the Netherlands, goods 
were  invoiced from  AP-International  to the Netherlands  and then  to Italy. 
Under the new structure, duties were based on the transfer price between AP 
and  AP-International  (not the  transfer  price  between  AP-International  and 
29. Pioneer status refers to special tax treatment for firms starting operations in Singapore. This 
firm recently abandoned pioneer status because its manufacturing operations were not profitable 
and because it wanted to average these losses with other Singaporean operations (which do not 
have pioneer status) and carry forward their losses (not allowed under pioneer status). 
30. Logistical concerns were the most important nontax requirements,  and they were easily 
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Fig 6.2  Distribution center invoicing patterns 
NB)  and the relatively  low Dutch  duty rate  for U.S.  imports.  Importantly, 
after  the  change,  AP’s  European  corporate-support  expenses were  moved 
from AP to AP-International, justifying a lower transfer price and thus lower 
duties from AP  to AP-International. 
6.3.3  Administrative Centers 
With  the recent  removal  of exchange controls and intra-European  duties 
and withholding taxes, firms are starting to consolidate European administra- 
tive activities, largely for tax reasons. Apparently, Belgian coordination Cen- 
ters (BCCs) are a particularly attractive way to shift income and related eco- 
nomic activities  from high-tax European countries to Belgium.  The income 
shifted may be taxed immediately in the United States but retains its foreign- 
source  character for the  purpose  of  determining  foreign  tax  credit  limita- 
tion~.~~  Also,  because  less taxes are paid  in high-tax countries,  companies 
reduce the likelihood of being in an excess foreign tax credit position. A small 
Belgian  tax  is  incurred, based  on the  administrative  costs  of  running the 
center. 
A  sample company recently  selected Belgium  over the Netherlands,  an- 
other popular site for an administrative center. The Belgian facility purchases 
receivables at a discount  (the shifted profit) from other European  sites and 
centralizes  hedging  activities  that  were previously  conducted  separately by 
each country manager.  All countries involved have agreed on a discount-rate 
3 1. Under section 0954(d), this income is deemed subpart F and is taxed immediately in the 
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formula based on the economic activity in Belgium. The formula has two 
components representing the normal interest rate and a hedging charge. In 
principle, country and coupling frictions affect the amount of activity that is 
centralized. For example, the sample firm elected not to centralize credit func- 
tions, because the local managers have superior information. This coupling 
friction fuses sales and distribution to the credit function. Also, in this case, 
the foreign tax credit benefit of  shifting credit risk is smaller because credit 
risk income would  be  assigned to  the related party-factor  income basket, 
whereas the hedging and normal interest fall in the general basket.  When 
queried about how aggressive they were in negotiating the discount rate, the 
CFO responded, “There is some room here, but you can’t be overly aggres- 
sive. Eventually, you have to deal with the European tax authorities when you 
are audited. Bears and bulls can both make money, but pigs never do.” 
This firm also considered embedding the BCC in a legal structure involving 
its Dutch and Swiss operations but eventually abandoned this idea in favor of 
establishing the BCC as a subsidiary of  a U.S. operation. However, the pro- 
posed  legal  structure  has  features  common  to  those  established by  other 
sample firms. Currently, the Swiss operation is a branch of  a Dutch parent, 
and the plan was to establish the BCC as another Dutch branch. The resulting 
structure would have had several advantages. First, it would have allowed the 
Swiss operation to serve as a banking center for all of  Europe, a common 
practice for the sample firms. Second, it would have allowed access to the 
Dutch treaty network. Third,  it would have also taken advantage of the low 
Swiss-Dutch combined tax rate on interest income generated from investing 
the Belgian profits. The sample firm ultimately abandoned the plan because it 
divested a manufacturing operation in Holland and,  as a result, no  longer 
qualified for the favorable tax rates on interest income. 
6.4  Sourcing Decisions: lkansfer Pricing and Performance Evaluation 
Sourcing decisions,  like location decisions, are affected by  both tax and 
nontax  considerations  that  frequently conflict,  Location decisions  involve 
trading off  coupling and country frictions (and restrictions) for tax benefits. 
Several mechanisms,  including evaluation and control systems and transfer 
prices, are used to coordinate sourcing decisions. As we have seen, nontax 
considerations (e.g., factor availability) can be viewed as frictions that fre- 
quently impede tax planning related to location decisions. Similarly, the de- 
sign of transfer prices and evaluation systems to coordinate dispersed activi- 
ties can result in coordination frictions that impede tax planning related to 
ongoing operations. Management’s challenge is to identify situations where 
conflicts between tax and nontax considerations are prominent and either to 
make a trade-off or to mitigate the frictions by creating alternative coordina- 
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Firms can shift profit from high- to low-tax countries by  sourcing more 
product from the low-tax country (while keeping transfer prices constant), by 
changing transfer prices  (while holding  sourcing decisions constant), or by 
combining these alternatives. Thus, the tax benefits associated with sourcing 
derive from two activities: (1) setting tax transfer prices and (2) setting the 
quantities that will be sourced from various locations. For the sample firms, 
setting tax transfer prices is a corporate responsibility that typically requires 
less coordination with noncorporate managers (including sector, group, and 
divisional managers) than does setting quantities.  Less coordination  is re- 
quired partly because the sample firms’ tax transfer prices do not affect oper- 
ating decisions or performance  evaluation^.^^ In contrast, sourcing quantities 
do affect,  and  are  affected by,  performance  measures and, unlike  transfer 
prices,  can be easily adjusted to account for changes  in economic circum- 
stances during a tax  year.  Also, for the sample firms, there frequently  are 
sourcing (quantity) situations where managers’ performance measures are in 
conflict with the corporate objective of maximizing  after-tax worldwide in- 
The extent of these conflicts varies depending on whether the firm 
uses  a pretax  or after-tax performance measure. In this section, I consider 
separately how tax transfer prices and performance measures affect sourcing 
decisions. In contrast to the previous section, where the primary focus was on 
location decisions, the discussion here centers more on the mechanisms (tax 
transfer prices and performance measures) that influence sourcing decisions 
than on the decisions per se. 
In subsection 6.4.1, I examine the role of transfer prices in sourcing deci- 
sions. First I consider differences in firms’ abilities to transfer price aggres- 
sively when there are no frictions or restrictions  to impede this behavior. I 
then discuss a coordination friction that involves the conflict between setting 
transfer prices to reduce taxes and setting them to motivate managers. Specif- 
ically, the coordination friction associated with setting transfer prices for tax 
reasons is the forgone operating efficiencies (from not using the optimal trans- 
fer prices for managerial purposes). The discussion then turns to the two ways 
that the sample firms cope with this friction. Some use separate transfer prices 
for tax and managerial purposes, while others use performance measures that 
are not affected by tax transfer prices. Presumably, the choice of whether to 
explicitly use two sets of transfer prices depends on whether the cost of  ex- 
plicitly  maintaining a separate set of  managerial transfer prices exceeds the 
32. Nevertheless,  some coordination is required when setting tax transfer prices, because for- 
eign managers must defend these prices when they are audited locally. 
33. In principle, a performance measure could be designed to ensure the correct distribution of 
quantities to maximize after-tax worldwide income. For such an ideal performance measure, there 
would  be  no  situations  where  managers’  actions  would  conflict  with  corporate  objectives. 
Whether such an ideal performance  measure exists and can be cost-effectively implemented is 
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forgone coordination benefits (or friction) of using an evaluation system that 
does not depend on tax transfer prices. The discussion then proffers a reason 
why these coordination frictions might be particularly small for some of the 
sample firms. Interestingly, the argument concludes that the firms that have 
the most flexibility in setting transfer prices also face the smallest coordina- 
tion friction. This absence of  frictions, it is further argued, explains recent 
transfer pricing restrictions including more extensive audits and more strin- 
gent enforcement penalties.  34 The transfer pricing discussion closes by  illus- 
trating how these restrictions have curbed aggressive transfer pricing. In fact, 
tax managers now  say that they are on the defensive and there is some evi- 
dence presented later to back this claim. 
Subsection 6.4.2 illustrates how sourcing decisions are coordinated differ- 
ently by firms that use pretax and after-tax performance systems. Because tax 
transfer prices do not  influence these performance measures, the  relevant 
managers must communicate regularly to ensure better sourcing decisions. 
This communication travels in both directions. Local managers are encour- 
aged to pursue local tax planning opportunities and to communicate these 
opportunities to the corporate tax office. The corporate office communicates 
the corporate tax profile and corporate tax strategy to the local managers and 
motivates them to use this information appropriately. Importantly, this com- 
munication is less critical for firms that use after-tax performance measures, 
suggesting that there must be reasons why firms use before-tax performance 
measures. One explanation is that after-tax measures are costly to develop and 
implement. Determining the “correct” tax rate for these after-tax performance 
measures is a complex, if not impossible, problem that requires considerable 
coordination between corporate and foreign tax  planner^.^' Section 6.4.2 con- 
tains a brief discussion of  how  firms that use pretax performance measures 
34. In the United States, 56662 sets the penalty for 5482 adjustments in excess of $20 million 
at 40 percent of the contested amount. However, 56664 provides an exception. Specifically, no 
penalty is imposed if the taxpayer can show reasonable cause and demonstrate that it acted in good 
faith. One of  the sample firms views the “defensive” transfer pricing strategies discussed in sub- 
section 6.4.1 as evidence of reasonable cause and good faith. Japanese tax officials are also scru- 
tinizing transfer prices more carefully recently. On March 31, 1986, the Japanese taxing authority 
received statutory authority to enforce transfer prices on foreign transactions. 
35. It requires knowledge about the company’s repatriation strategy, its forecasts of future prof- 
itability at various locations, and a host of other tax planning considerations. When foreign man- 
agers are evaluated after-tax, using such a rate, they will essentially share tax benefits with other 
facilities.  Corporate tax rates on worldwide income are reduced because foreign tax credits of 
various foreign subsidiaries and gains and losses (within the same country) are averaged when 
corporate taxes are determined. More generally, corporate tax rates are reduced because corporate 
tax managers coordinate the separate activities of foreign tax managers. The reduction in corpo- 
rate taxes due to synergies resulting from this coordination, like the benefits of foreign tax credit 
averaging, cannot be attributed to a specific foreign location.  Viewing tax as another cost, the 
challenge  is to determine the correct marginal cost of  an action that is affected by  and affects 
others’ past, current, and future actions. From the cost accounting literature, we know that this is 
a tough challenge, both theoretically and practically. 221  The Role of  Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
manage tax  versus nontax conflicts related to sourcing decisions. Another 
subsection illustrates, in general, how a large multinational firm coordinates 
worldwide tax planning and, in particular, how  the budgeting process and 
after-tax performance measures influence sourcing patterns. 
6.4.1  Transfer Pricing 
Flexibility 
Subject to restrictions imposed by tax authorities throughout the world, tax 
transfer prices can be set so that profits are shifted from high- to low-tax lo- 
cations.  Why  do  opportunities to  transfer price  aggressively differ across 
firms? The magnitude of the tax transfer price benefit depends on the firm’s 
repatriation policy, the dispersion of its tax rates across different countries, the 
size of its gross margin, its ability to decouple activities in its value chain and 
locate them in low-tax countries, and the extent of government restrictions. If 
profits are repatriated immediately from all worldwide locations, then the tax 
transfer price benefit is reduced. There is still an incentive to shift profits to 
avoid high foreign taxes and to manage foreign tax credits. But, without de- 
ferral, the lowest tax rate possible on worldwide income is the American rate. 
Several of the sample firms’ managers claim that firms with high gross mar- 
gins are in the best position to transfer price aggressively. This may be true, 
because gross margins are typically high for products that have no comparable 
unrelated-party prices (cups).  Gross margins are high,  for example,  when 
there are barriers to entry, when operating risks are high, and when firms have 
large investments in intangibles such as R&D and marketing. Products with 
these traits have fewer comparable products, and as one manager indicated, 
“their correct transfer prices are almost impossible to determine.” Gross mar- 
gins alone, however, do not provide the opportunity to transfer price aggres- 
sively. Firms must also be able to decouple their business activities and dis- 
perse them to low-tax countries. As we shall see in section 6.4.2, aggressive 
transfer pricing has been curbed recently. However, in some industries, trans- 
fer pricing is still an important tax planning consideration. 
In  addition to managerial and tax considerations, duties and (in the phar- 
maceutical industry) price approvals reduce the flexibility in setting transfer 
prices. In the pharmaceutical industry, price approvals are frequently based on 
cost-plus formulas, so companies have a strong incentive to increase transfer 
prices on intermediate products. Because most sales are in high-tax countries, 
the tax and regulatory incentives are concordant. Specifically, firms want to 
transfer goods into high-tax countries at higher transfer prices. However, if 
there is pressure to lower transfer prices because of duties, the prices of goods 
sold are also lowered. This duty-price trade-off probably explains, at least 
partially, why duties are so high for pharmaceuticals; countries can use duties 
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pricing committees have members from more functional areas than the other 
sample firms do. Nevertheless, both tax and nontax managers at the sample 
firms generally agreed that tax “has the loudest voice” when it comes to trans- 
fer pricing.36 
Coordination Frictions 
Transfer prices can also be used for nontax reasons, including motivating 
foreign tax  managers to source more efficiently. When firms use the same 
transfer prices for tax and managerial purposes, they will be less inclined to 
let tax considerations dictate how these prices are set if the nontax benefits are 
large. The nontax benefits associated with transfer prices (coordination fric- 
tions) differ across firms. Smaller centralized firms rely less on mechanisms 
such as transfer prices to coordinate activities. For example, a manager at one 
of  the more centralized sample firms stated, “We do not view ourselves as a 
company with  several independent businesses around the world, just plants 
and sales offices. Thus, transfer prices, as devices to motivate efficient deci- 
sion making, are not important.” In contrast, the potential benefits from de- 
signing transfer prices and evaluation systems to meet nontax objectives are 
substantial for  the  decentralized sample firms that  have  multiple  strategic 
business units (SBUs). One of the sample firms uses transfer prices to facili- 
tate long-run strategic initiatives.  In particular, it transfers additional profit 
(on its managerial books only) to compensate for large start-up losses in coun- 
tries where it envisions tremendous growth potential in the next century. The 
objective is to motivate local managers. 
In addition to firm size and the extent of  decentralization, companies that 
have unique intermediate products benefit less from the nontax advantages 
associated with transfer prices. Specifically, a major nontax benefit of transfer 
prices is that they can motivate managers to source intermediates from the 
lowest-cost supplier. Thus, when intermediates are not available from outside 
vendors,  the  forgone  coordination  benefits  associated with  using  transfer 
prices are relatively small. Interestingly, firms that sell blockbuster products 
that are very unique at all stages of manufacturing have both the most flexibil- 
ity in setting tax transfer prices and the smallest coordination frictions. 
How Firms Cope with Coordination Frictions 
When the coordination frictions associated with transfer pricing become 
large, firms have an incentive to develop alternative mechanisms to motivate 
managers. To this end, they can establish separate transfer prices for tax and 
managerial purposes or  use  performance measures that  do not  depend on 
transfer prices. All of the sample firms use one of these alternatives. 
36. This does not necessarily mean, however, that tax has the most clout because they can shift 
profits and increase after-tax cash flow. Tax managers must defend their transfer prices to taxing 
officials around the world, and some tax managers indicated that, left on their own, nontax man- 
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A common view is that taxing authorities will challenge two sets of transfer 
prices. Presumably, the argument is that tax transfer prices must pass a busi- 
ness purpose test and that they cannot possibly do so if the business is using 
alternative prices. The fallacy with this argument is that transfer prices can 
serve multiple business purposes. Taxing authorities expect tax transfer prices 
to assign an “appropriate” amount of profit to each location, and there clearly 
are situations where tax transfer prices will also meet firms’ nontax incentive 
objectives. But firms with  both cost and profit centers have no managerial 
reason to assign profit to the cost centers. Indeed, some of  the sample firms 
assign all profit to the managers who set customer sales prices, presumably to 
protect gross margins. Also, some take losses on their corporate office mana- 
gerial books to motivate subsidiary managers. In these situations, the total 
profit assigned to subsidiaries exceeds the company profits. For example, as 
indicated earlier, one sample firm’s managerial transfer prices are used to fa- 
cilitate the long-term corporate strategy. Additional profit is assigned to for- 
eign managers, to compensate for start-up losses, in a location where the firm 
is trying to “get in early,” and an offsetting loss is recorded at the corporate 
office. 
Besides using different transfer prices for tax and performance evaluation 
purposes, firms reduce coordination frictions that impede tax planning by de- 
signing performance  evaluation measures  that  do  not  depend  on transfer 
prices. The resulting performance systems may not be optimal from a nontax 
perspective, but they allow the firm to base transfer prices on tax considera- 
tions. For example, some of the sample firms evaluate manufacturing facili- 
ties as cost centers but only include costs related to transactions outside the 
firm. Thus, transfer prices do not affect these performance measures. By  ex- 
cluding transfer prices, as mentioned earlier, the company might be sacrificing 
an opportunity to increase foreign managers’ incentive to control costs. Im- 
plicitly, these firms are using different transfer prices for tax and managerial 
purposes. These implicit managerial transfer prices assign zero profit to the 
manufacturing facilities and all of the profits to the distribution centers. 
Current Strategies: Ogensive or Defensive? 
The pressure on tax transfer prices from authorities throughout the world 
has significantly checked aggressive transfer pricing. This subsection exam- 
ines more closely why managers’ ability to set transfer prices to reduce taxes 
has been curbed. It closes with an example that illustrates reinvoicing, a com- 
mon way to assign profit. This example demonstrates how the collective pres- 
sures from taxing authorities are causing transfer prices to converge closer to 
economic reality-to  assign profit commensurate with the economic value 
added. 
How  aggressively do sample firms set transfer prices? Tax managers uni- 
formly agreed that even if there are “correct” transfer prices, they are virtually 
impossible to estimate (for products that have no comparable unrelated-party 224  G. Peter Wilson 
prices).  As a result,  managers have tremendous discretion in setting them. 
They  also agree that the taxing  authorities, especially those  in the  United 
States, are making it very difficult for firms to exercise this discretion as freely 
as they once did. Some firms are more aggressive than others, but most concur 
that the grey area for setting transfer prices has narrowed and that firms need 
to develop a comprehensive transfer pricing policy and apply it consistently. 
A vice president of tax emphasized the trend toward a defensive transfer pric- 
ing ~trategy:~’ 
There are two strategies-offensive  or defensive. An offensive strategy is 
simply shifting income to the lowest tax jurisdiction under the darkness of 
night approach-essentially  hoping the taxing authorities will not find it. 
A defensive strategy views a corporate taxpayer more like a stakeholder; 
that is, the company is going to pay taxes somewhere in the world, thus 
what the company wants to do is avoid costly and time-consuming price 
disputes by putting into place a pricing policy that will withstand scrutiny 
by all taxing authorities. These are not necessarily either/or strategies and 
can be used selectively in tandem. In the past, my personal view was that 
most taxpayers were offensive. However, a number of things are changing, 
such as better  and tougher audits both here and overseas and substantial 
penalties for being overly aggressive. As a result, I think that most multi- 
nationals are shifting to a defensive mode. 
The following example illustrates how a sample firm modified its transfer 
pricing policy to reflect their more defensive posture. This example also illus- 
trates that transfer pricing can be somewhat more complicated than just setting 
the price between two locations to reduce worldwide taxes.  The firm uses 
reinvoicing (explained below) to get the “right” profit into two countries. The 
company assembles in a low-tax Asian country a product that is sold in nu- 
merous locations,  including Australia.  Although  the  product  is physically 
shipped from the low-tax Asian country directly to an Australian  sales and 
distribution center,  the invoices follow one of two triangular routes: either 
from the low-tax Asian country to Hong Kong and then to Australia or from 
the low-tax Asian country to the United States and then to Australia. Hong 
Kong is also a low-tax location for this firm, and the Australian and American 
operations are taxed at approximately the same higher rate. 
The product in this example is very profitable. The reinvoicing objective is 
to put profit in the low-tax Asian country, Australia, and the United States in 
such a way  as to satisfy  all of the taxing authorities and, presumably, still 
reduce worldwide taxes. Without reinvoicing ,  the company believes that too 
much profit, relative to the value added, would be split between the low-tax 
Asian country and Australia. One tax manager suggested that the collective 
profit was too large because historically royalty payments back to the United 
37. On reading this quote, tax managers at one of the sample firms emphasized that the offen- 
sive strategy described is “too strong.” They agreed that many firms had been more offensive in 
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States were probably too small. The vice president of  tax was particularly 
interested in  having the Australian profit  be  consistent with  the economic 
value of  the distribution center because of concerns about future tax audits. 
Although the Australian taxing authority would not object to having too much 
Australian profit now,  it might object to large losses later if the market expe- 
riences a downturn. According to the tax manager, “It is better to get the right 
amount of profit there in the first place and to be consistent.” Also, the tax 
managers were concerned that the Australian authorities might mistakenly in- 
terpret the reinvoicing as an effort to shift profit from Australia to a low-tax 
country (and to the United States because the income is subpart F): 
We  used Hong Kong rather than a low-tax country such as the Cayman 
Islands because our Hong Kong operation deserved the profits (on their 
local-legal books) and because we were concerned about Australian audit 
exposure.  In  the  event the  Australian authorities challenge the  transfer 
prices,  we want to be in a position to argue business purpose; the Hong 
Kong operation is the heart of our regional operations, and sales between 
the low-tax Asian country and Australia are facilitated by  the Hong Kong 
office. Also,  the Hong Kong operation was already paying royalties on 
other products,  so they could conveniently start royalty payments on the 
new product. 
Under the reinvoicing arrangement, a cost-plus transfer price is used for prod- 
uct leaving the low-tax Asian country, a common pricing approach for manu- 
facturing facilities, and a resale-minus transfer price is used for product enter- 
ing Australia,  also a  standard approach for sales and distribution centers. 
Consistent “plus” and “minus” percentages are used throughout the world for 
comparable products,  even if  costs and  sales prices differ.  Regardless,  of 
whether the reinvoicing goes through Hong Kong or the United States, the 
residual profit is taxed immediately in the United States and is characterized 
as foreign-sourced for the purpose of determining the foreign tax credit limi- 
tation. 
6.4.2  Performance Measures 
Pretax Performance Measures 
Many of  the sample firms evaluate managers below the rank of  the vice 
president using pretax measures that are not influenced by transfer prices.38  In 
some, manufacturing centers are evaluated as cost centers, and sales offices 
are evaluated based on companywide profit, defined as sales price less total 
costs at all locations. Thus, although transfer prices are influenced by duties, 
38. Although I did not systematically ask managers why they did not use an after-tax perform- 
ance measure, a few offered reasons. One claimed that foreign managers did not control transfer 
prices, and their impact on foreign taxes swamped other planning considerations.  Another empha- 
sized the  difficulty of allocating the  benefits of foreign tax credits and other items to various 
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taxes, and regulatory issues, they are not designed to coordinate activities or 
align effort. 
How  do corporate  managers ensure after-tax  profit  maximization  when 
sourcing managers are evaluated pretax? A potential conflict occurs, for ex- 
ample, when the tax savings from producing in a lower-tax country exceed 
the operating cost savings from producing in a higher-tax country. When there 
is a downturn in worldwide sales, corporate managers would prefer that pro- 
duction be reduced in.  the higher-tax country. However, their choice conflicts 
with that of the sourcing manager-presuming  the sourcing manager is moti- 
vated strictly by pretax profits. How is this situation managed? Typically, the 
sourcing managers communicate their concerns about not making their pro- 
duction targets to the corporate managers. In some of the sample companies, 
corporate managers convey this concern to their bonus committees, and infor- 
mal adjustments are made. In others, an explicit adjustment is made on the 
managerial books to protect the sourcing manager’s profits. The corporate of- 
fice absorbs a loss equal to the marginal operating costs of producing in the 
lower-tax country.39 
After-tax Performance Measures 
Two  of  the firms are very decentralized and use after-tax evaluation sys- 
tems. Tax transfer prices do not affect evaluations for reasons discussed ear- 
lier. The following example illustrates how  one firm coordinates worldwide 
tax planning, how its after-tax performance measure is determined, and how 
sourcing targets are established as part of the budget process. 
The company is organized both by strategic business units (SBUs) and by 
geographic regions.  As in the other sample firms, the vice president of  tax 
reports directly to the CFO, as do the vice presidents of treasury, control, and 
international finance. A domestic tax manager and international tax manager 
each report directly to the vice president of tax, along with several other man- 
agers not relevant to this example. The international tax manager coordinates 
international operations with geographic tax managers located throughout the 
world,  who report indirectly to the vice president of  international finance. 
None of the above managers are in the SBU organizations. The SBU general 
managers report directly to the chief executive officer (CEO), as does the 
CFO. Each SBU organization has a finance staff  at its sector offices in the 
United States and financial managers spread throughout the world. The SBU 
country financial managers control the local operating entities and convey im- 
portant information that is used for annual tax planning. 
39. Some would argue that taxes distort real economic activity in this situation; production is 
shifted to the higher-cost location. A fallacy in this argument is that it ignores operating benefits 
related to public goods that are priced in tax rates. For example, the higher-operating-cost country 
might have toll roads (which are reflected in the operating costs), while the lower-operating-cost 
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Each year, an annual worldwide tax plan is developed following a proce- 
dure similar to the one used to develop nontax budgets. Besides establishing 
guidelines, this process facilitates worldwide communication. The local of- 
fices convey the specific information needed to develop the worldwide tax 
plan, and the corporate office in turn communicates the company’s tax profile 
to  local managers to encourage them to keep a companywide perspective 
when executing the plan. 
To  see how the process works, consider the United Kingdom, where the 
company has several SBU offices. The U.K. financial manager is responsible 
for tax, treasury, and statutory accounting and is part of the geographic orga- 
nization managed by  the vice president of  international finance. He or she 
coordinates finance, recruiting, and training for the SBUs and files a consoli- 
dated U.K.  tax form. Tax  planning starts during the second fiscal quarter, 
immediately after the tax office completes compliance for the prior year. The 
U.K.  financial manager collects profitability projections and other vital tax 
planning information from the SBUs. This information is incorporated into 
the first draft of  the U.K. tax plan that is submitted to the European tax man- 
ager, along with  similar plans from all of  Europe. Next, the first stage of 
sourcing coordination starts, with the European tax manager serving as a liai- 
son between the international tax manager at the corporate office and the coun- 
try financial managers. For example, after a negotiation with the country man- 
agers, a decision might be made to source more of  a specific intermediate 
product from France and less from the United Kingdom. These country sourc- 
ing targets are the basis for the SBU budgets that are subsequently used to 
establish the after-tax performance measures discussed later. 
Throughout the next year, when the plan is executed, the international and 
geographic tax  managers communicate regularly to  adjust for unexpected 
events and to exchange information required for setting tax policies. The in- 
ternational tax manager-who,  along with the general tax attorney, the vice 
president of tax, and the vice president of international finance, is part of the 
transfer pricing committee-ensures  that transfer price policy is applied con- 
sistently and collects information that is used to amend it. Country financial 
managers, for example, voice concerns about local audit pressures. Also, the 
international tax manager helps regional and country managers interpret trans- 
fer price policy and coordinates sourcing adjustments similar to the one in the 
reinvoicing example given above. 
Evaluations for all managers responsible for outside sales, including those 
that manage a single product line, are largely based on return on net assets, 
with most business units using after-tax return on net assets.40  The denomina- 
tor of this measure, net assets, is assets less liabilities for the unit being eval- 
uated. The numerator depends on market profit and loss statements that have 
40. The exceptions are business units that do not influence taxes, and situations where corporate 
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several incentive features and are based on managerial, rather than tax, trans- 
fer prices.  These transfer prices change over time as the corporate office 
changes managerial emphasi~.~’  As was the case for the example in the previ- 
ous section, when the profit at a specific site differs from the legal-entity profit 
(reported for local tax, financial reporting, and duty considerations), a corpo- 
rate account picks up the difference. Note that return on net assets does not 
provide individual managers with a direct incentive to coordinate activities 
such as sourcing. Thus, the tax planning and ongoing communication consid- 
erations, discussed earlier, work in tandem with return on net assets to facili- 
tate planning. 
6.5  Summary and Conclusions 
This  field study examines how  taxes influence nine firms’ location and 
sourcing decisions. A conceptual framework is introduced to help organize 
salient industry and business activity characteristics that determine the role of 
taxes in location decisions. It proposes three categories of nontax considera- 
tions (or frictions): coupling frictions, which tend to fuse activities together in 
a firm’s value chain; country frictions, which are the opportunity cost of locat- 
ing a specific activity, or collection of activities, in a particular country; and 
coordination frictions, which are associated with incentive and communica- 
tion  mechanisms that  impede tax  minimizations. Firms assign facilities in 
their product value chains to countries where the maximum value is added at 
a minimum after-tax cost. To  this end, they must first identify spots in their 
value chains where coupling frictions are small and then locate these separate 
facilities, taking account of country and coordination frictions and local taxes. 
Given existing facilities, firms must also utilize existing capacity in response 
to  unexpected changes in  demand,  operating conditions,  and  tax  circum- 
stances. Several mechanisms, including evaluation and control systems and 
transfer prices, are used to coordinate these sourcing decisions. The design of 
these mechanisms can result in coordination frictions that impede tax planning 
related to these ongoing operations. A field study is a particularly useful way 
to identify both nontax and tax factors that managers consider when making 
these location and sourcing decisions. 
The results are based on interviews with chief financial officers and high- 
level managers from manufacturing, treasury, tax, and strategy, about sixty- 
eight location decisions that  were made during the past twenty-five years. 
41. This is the sample firm that uses managerial transfer prices as a mechanism to achieve 
strategic objectives.  For example, the company is an Asian country for long-term strategic rea- 
sons, especially for marketing reasons (to get a foothold) and for technology exchange considera- 
tions. Although it eventually expects to realize profits, it is currently operating at a loss (in the 
sense that current-period revenues do not cover the current-period ‘‘true’’ economic costs).  Be- 
cause no one enjoys working for an unprofitable firm, the firm sets transfer prices that make the 
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These interviews  suggest  several conclusions  related  to location decisions. 
First, tax considerations largely dictate location decisions for business activi- 
ties where these frictions are small, such as administrative and distribution 
centers.  The examples in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3  illustrate how taxes fre- 
quently dominate the decision to locate administrative and distribution centers 
in countries where these activities are tax favored. Second, nontax considera- 
tions are very important  for all manufacturing  location decisions, including 
those where  the final decision  is to locate in a low-tax country.  Moreover, 
while taxes are an important consideration in locating manufacturing facili- 
ties, they rarely dominate the decision process. Even when taxes prevail, the 
decisions are typically close. Depending on the industry, these decisions are 
also influenced by operating requirements,  marketing issues, or, more gener- 
ally, global  strategic considerations.  The examples  in  section 6.3.1 under- 
score the importance of nontax considerations,  even for basic manufacturing 
such as assembly operations in the semiconductor industry and dispersion and 
fill/finish manufacturing in the pharmaceutical industries. 
Transfer prices affect both sourcing and location decisions and the sample 
firms’ managers claim that firms with high gross margins are in the best posi- 
tion to transfer price aggressively. This follows because firms with high gross 
margins usually have no comparable unrelated-party prices (cups) that can be 
used as transfer price benchmarks.  The Scholes and Wolfson framework sug- 
gests that nontax frictions should prevent these firms from transfer pricing too 
aggressively (relative to taxing authorities’ assessments) or, absent these fric- 
tions, that government restrictions should be forthcoming. The findings sug- 
gest  that  the  coordination  frictions  commonly  thought  to curb  aggressive 
transfer pricing do not affect the sample firms. The standard argument is that 
transfer  prices  can facilitate  efficient local decisions,  effort  alignment,  and 
communication, and firms thus will be reluctant to distort transfer prices for 
tax reasons. Central to this argument is the presumption that the same transfer 
prices are being used for tax and managerial purposes. For the sample firms, 
this assumption is not valid; either they use separate transfer prices for tax and 
managerial purposes, or transfer prices do not affect performance  measures. 
Instead, the interviews suggest that managers’ ability to transfer price aggres- 
sively has been considerably curbed recently by the threats of hefty penalties 
and extensive audits in many countries including the United States, Germany, 
and Japan. These restrictions seem to have been very effective. While some of 
the interviewed managers claim to push transfer prices toward the boundaries 
of the gray area that defines acceptable practice, most of them agree that the 
gray  area has  shrunk dramatically.  Indeed, some now  employ  a defensive 
transfer pricing strategy; they have developed comprehensive transfer pricing 
policies  that  they  use consistently  throughout  the  world.  Thus, while  the 
sample firms’ tax managers are very sophisticated and prefer not to “leave tax 
benefits on the table,” they are also sensitive to government restrictions. 
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cient resource allocations related to overly aggressive tax planning may  be 
exaggerated. First, the amount of real economic activity in low-tax countries 
seems  to  be  commonly  understated.  The  argument that  drug  companies 
simply put pills in bottles in Puerto Rico grossly underestimates both the so- 
phistication and amount of manufacturing activity in Puerto Rico. Moreover, 
while Puerto Rico continues to offer attractive tax benefits to pharmaceuticals, 
the amount of these benefits is not influenced by transfer prices for many firms 
(because they currently use the profit-split method discussed in footnote 14). 
This demonstrates that taxes can influence location and sourcing decisions in 
situations where managers are not aggressively setting transfer prices. Sec- 
ond, even when large tax benefits are required to compensate for nontax con- 
siderations and firms locate in low-tax countries, it does not necessarily fol- 
low that taxes are distorting efficient resource allocations. In making location 
decisions, managers consider differences across country infrastructures that 
(among other things) are partially reflected in tax rates. For example, they 
consider the quality of education systems, communication systems, transpor- 
tation systems, and other public goods that are generally subsidized by taxes. 
Thus, because tax rates reflect infrastructure differences and infrastructure de- 
mands vary across industries and activities, eficienf resource allocations can, 
at least in principle, depend on taxes. 
The results also suggest that the role of taxes and the relative importance of 
various  nontax  considerations  in  location  and  sourcing  decisions  have 
changed dramatically during the sample period. First, twenty years ago, firms 
were primarily looking for low-cost labor in low-tax countries to manufacture 
for the U.S. market. These location decisions were, in part,  a response to 
foreign competition in U.S. markets. Today, many U.S.  companies’ markets 
are global, and their location decisions are motivated by  regional marketing 
considerations. They want a manufacturing operation in Europe or Asia be- 
cause their marketing departments believe that sales will increase if  they are 
perceived as a local company or because they need to meet local-content re- 
quirements. Having made the decision to locate a manufacturing facility in 
one of  these economic zones,  they then minimize after-tax costs.  Second, 
automation in manufacturing has resulted in a dramatic decline in direct labor 
costs as a proportion of total manufacturing costs, especially for low-cost un- 
skilled labor. As a consequence, firms are less inclined to locate offshore to 
reduce  labor costs than  they  were previously. Third,  with  the opening of 
global financial markets and the removal of exchange controls, financial op- 
erating costs have declined. As a result, firms are beginning to locate financial 
centers in low-tax countries. Fourth, tax benefits are not as plentiful in Asia 
as  they  were  ten  years  ago.  Japanese firms have  made  large investments 
throughout Asia recently. This has caused countries to decrease tax conces- 
sions. Fifth, and more of a conjecture, if tax rates in Europe harmonize more 
slowly than drug prices, pharmaceuticals will begin to locate major facilities 
in Ireland and other low-tax European countries. Currently, price approvals, 231  The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
not taxes, determine pharmaceuticals’ site choices in Europe; but if prices are 
harmonized, these choices will more closely resemble those in the semicon- 
ductor industry. 
A sequel to this paper will examine how firms coordinate tax and treasury 
planning. In particular, it will examine how the sample firms used in this study 
move cash and finance new foreign facilities. 
References 
Carolin, R., H. Diener, C.  McConnell, and R. Jaikumar.  1984. Note on integrated 
Porter, M.  E. 1990. The competitive advantage of nations. New York: Free Press. 
Scholes, M.,  and M. Wolfson. 1991. Tuxes and business strategy: A global planning 
Yofie, D.  1987. The global semiconductor industry, Harvard Business School Case 
circuit manufacturing. Harvard Business School Case number 9-684-07  1. 
approach. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
number 9-388-052. 
Comment  R. Glenn Hubbard 
Peter Wilson’s paper differs from  the standard  offering in  the literature on 
international aspects of taxation.  It offers descriptive evidence from careful 
case studies, as opposed to econometric analysis of existing firm-level data or 
aggregate time-series data. The goal of the research agenda begun in this pa- 
per is to identify and characterize nontax benefits and costs in order to formu- 
late better economic models of location, investment, transfer pricing, and fi- 
nancial policy decisions. 
An analogy to studies of  corporate debt by specialists in public finance or 
corporate finance is instructive. We know a great deal about tax incentives for 
alternative financial structures. We know much less about nontax benefits and 
cost of leverage. Understanding the latter is nonetheless important for under- 
standing  connections  between  tax  factors  and  capital  structure.  Financial 
economists can use case studies to improve modeling of  nontax benefits and 
costs of corporate debt. 
Wilson’s paper is offered in this spirit. There is an immediate problem con- 
fronting such an approach, however. If  tax factors in international decisions 
are often complicated and confusing, nontax factors can be even more so. It is 
certainly possible to list nontax considerations. Field studies such as Wilson’s 
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Columbia University, former deputy  assistant secretary (tax analysis),  U.S. Department of the 
Treasury. and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 232  G.  Peter Wilson 
are definitely useful for identifying tax and nontax considerations in various 
corporate decisions. The more difficult and interesting task is to organize these 
considerations in such a way as to guide the development of economic mod- 
els. It is this more ambitious agenda that he has in mind. 
Building on the approach in Scholes and Wolfson (1991), he categorizes 
nontax factors as “restrictions” (government rules) or “frictions” (costs asso- 
ciated with meeting other business purposes. I think it is simplest to think of 
these,  as “institutional factors” or “nontax benefits and costs.” Straightforward 
industrial organization considerations suggest that plausible subcategories in- 
clude product- or industry-specific characteristics (e.g., production process, 
importance of  distance to market,  economies of  scale or entry strategies), 
country-specific characteristics (e.g., regulation or presence of particular in- 
frastructure), and firm-specific characteristics (e.g., intrafirm coordination is- 
sues and information and incentive problems). 
The  usefulness  of  field  interviews  depends  in  part,  of  course,  on  the 
sample. Wilson conducted detailed on-site interviews with chief financial of- 
ficers and their staffs in nine U.S. multinational corporations. The industrial 
mix  is three pharmaceutical firms, three semiconductor firms, one chemical 
firm, one materials firm, and one software firm. The overrepresentation of 
pharmaceuticals and semiconductors reflects the perceived importance of in- 
ternational tax planning in those industries. 
The interviews gathered information on  sixty-eight location decisions in 
twenty-five countries; the decisions spanned the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s. Wilson was also able to obtain some information on transfer pric- 
ing and compensation policy. The primary focus of  the study is an examina- 
tion of tax and nontax factors in location (capacity expansion) and sourcing 
(capacity utilization) decisions. 
Wilson’s conclusions are intuitive but nonetheless important, given the pau- 
city of information about the role of tax planning in multinationals’ decisions. 
First,  for manufacturing location decisions, nontax considerations are very 
important. In particular, part of the apparent insensitivity to tax considerations 
could reflect the link between taxes paid and the provision of important infra- 
structure (e.g., in education and transportation support). Second, where non- 
tax considerations are not particularly important (e.g., for administrative or 
distribution centers), tax considerations are paramount. Third, the effective- 
ness of transfer pricing in reducing multinationals’ worldwide tax burdens is 
limited by  nontax  factors.  Interestingly,  government restrictions dominate 
problems in intrafirm coordination in this respect. In principle, firms’ use of 
transfer pricing for tax planning could be reduced by  the need to evaluate 
managers for compensation or other purposes.  Wilson finds that firms can 
effectively use information from multiple accounts to guide tax planning on 
the one hand and managerial evaluation and compensation on the other. 
Perhaps the most useful information in this stage of the research is the anal- 
ysis of differences across industries and stages of production within an indus- 233  The Role of  Taxes in Location and Sourcing Decisions 
try  in  the  importance  of  nontax  considerations.  Again,  one  can  straight- 
forwardly think of these as product- or industry-specific, country-specific, or 
firm-specific . 
One would expect country-specific considerations (e.g., the availability of 
skilled workers) to be important in stages of  production in which there are 
high fixed costs for research and development or regulatory approval. These 
fixed costs figure prominently in the pharmaceutical and semiconductor in- 
dustries.  For  those  industries,  tax  considerations are not  as  important as 
location-specific nontax benefits and costs in the early stages of product de- 
velopment. On the other hand, in the production stage, both pharmaceutical 
and semiconductor products have low marginal costs of production and can be 
manufactured in many places. Country-specific nontax factors are much less 
important, and tax considerations are correspondingly more important. 
Where infrastructure and product regulation concerns are not significant, 
one would expect tax planning to be important in high-margin lines of busi- 
ness. Software manufacturing is a good example in which high margins reflect 
the value of  intangible assets and the manufacturing process is simple. Ag- 
gressive use of transfer pricing should be important in the software business, 
subject to limitations arising from firm-specific concerns (e.g., intrafirm co- 
ordination problems) or government restrictions. Wilson finds that the latter, 
government restrictions, provide the principal discipline against aggressive 
transfer pricing.  That is, firm-specific considerations do not appear to limit 
tax incentives to the same extent that country-specific considerations do. 
In the case of  the chemical industry, for which margins and the value of 
research and development intangibles are low, distance to market (a country- 
specific factor) is the principal consideration in location and sourcing deci- 
sions.  Because  chemical  manufacturing facilities arguably generate fewer 
nontax  benefits and more nontax costs for host  countries than would,  say, 
pharmaceutical or semiconductor facilities, fewer tax incentives are offered. 
As  a result, tax considerations are more likely to be important in expansion 
decisions than in greenfield investment decisions. 
Similarly, industry- and country-specific nontax factors are most important 
for firms in the materials industry. Product characteristics and individual cus- 
tomer needs place geographic limits on location. As a result, tax considera- 
tions are significant only among geographically close jurisdictions that offer 
the desired nontax benefits for the business. 
Wilson’s analysis of possible tensions between tax-motivated transfer pric- 
ing and firm-specific requirements for evaluation and control is very interest- 
ing. From a tax planning perspective, the principal factors governing the use- 
fulness of transfer pricing include the dispersion of tax rates across countries 
in which the parent has operations, gross margins and the importance of intan- 
gibles,  and government restrictions. Tax-motivated transfer pricing is most 
beneficial for firms with high gross margins as a result of  intangible assets 
with few comparable unrelated-party prices (e.g.,  pharmaceutical manufac- 234  G.  Peter Wilson 
turers), as long as government restrictions are not too severe. Tax considera- 
tions are not the only motivation, however. Noting “multiple business pur- 
poses,” Wilson’s interviews document firm-specific plans to shift profits for 
nontax reasons to motivate managers. 
A priori, one might imagine that the need to evaluate and motivate manag- 
ers would reduce a corporate parent’s willingness to “relocate” profits across 
its foreign subsidiaries to minimize its worldwide tax burden. According to 
Wilson, firms are generally able to reduce nontax costs that impede tax plan- 
ning by designing measures for performance evaluation that do not depend on 
transfer prices. How do corporate managers ensure after-tax profit maximiza- 
tion when managers are evaluated on a pretax basis? Wilson notes that “infor- 
mal adjustments are made.” Interviews and case studies are useful for describ- 
ing these adjustments. Much more detail here would be instructive. 
I have a related concern with the paper’s analysis of effects of tax planning 
on real resource allocation-a  question critically important to economists. 
Wilson argues that “the amount and sophistication of real economic activity 
in low-tax countries seems to be commonly understated.” Much more specific 
discussion would be useful. Returning to the discussion of country-specific 
factors, for example, to the extent that cross-country heterogeneity in tax rates 
reflects differences in infrastructure or other benefits, there may be little dis- 
tortion of real resource allocation. 
Finally, three avenues for further research seem particularly promising. 
First, for the current sample, an analysis of  shifts in firms’ decisions before 
and after the Tax Reform Act of  1986 would be instructive. Second, multi- 
nationals’ jnancial policy decisions (e.g., repatriation or capital structure de- 
cisions) offer a good laboratory for analysis. In contrast to the decisions stud- 
ied in  the present paper, country-specific and product- or industry-specific 
factors should be less important, and firm-specific factors should be more im- 
portant. As a result, one could study trade-offs between tax factors and firm- 
related nontax factors. Finally, at the “extensive margin,” detailed interviews 
and  case studies for non-U. S. parents  would  facilitate our discrimination 
among alternative tax and nontax factors in affecting multinational firms’ de- 
cisions. 
These suggestions are more easily offered than executed. Wilson’s paper is 
a difficult and important first step in our using case study evidence to shape 
economic models of multinational firm decisions. 